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Still the Stranger at the Feast? Ideology and the Study of 




This article explores the way in which scholars of twentieth-century British 
politics have engaged with the concept of ideology. It begins by revisiting Michael 
Freeden’s seminal intervention on the subject before going on to assess the way 
in which recent work has challenged, and indeed preserved, older assumptions 
about the nature and function of political ideas. In doing so, it pursues two 
objectives: it seeks to demonstrate the consequences of regarding ideas as a 
significant feature of twentieth-century politics, and it attempts to encourage a 
more vibrant dialogue between historians and other disciplines that are 
contributing to the field of ideology studies.  
 
 
In the inaugural issue of Twentieth Century British History, Michael Freeden 
discussed the way in which historians of modern British politics had engaged with 
the concept of ideology. His principal observation was that many accounts had 
devoted insufficient attention to ideas. Not only had they assumed that ideology 
was an eliminable feature of political systems, but they had also suggested that 
ideas were the epiphenomena of other social and economic forces. Ideology, 
Freeden concluded, was often the ‘the stranger at the feast’.1 This article revisits 
Freeden’s intervention and explores how recent scholarship has engaged with 
political ideology. In doing so, it pursues two objectives. First, it attempts to 
expose what is at stake when ideology is awarded an adequate status within 
understandings of modern British politics. And second, it encourages a more 
vibrant dialogue between historians and other disciplines that are contributing to 
the field of ideology studies.  
 
Freeden’s intervention can be summarised briefly. In it, Freeden identified three 
problematic assumptions that had concealed ideology from the historian’s gaze. 
The first concerned the way in which ideology had been defined. Within many 
accounts, Freeden noted, it was assumed that ideology emerged from specialised, 
doctrinaire forms of thought and was produced by political elites. This notion was 
problematic in two respects: it invited the assumption that ideology was an 
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eliminable feature of political systems, and it concealed ‘the connections between 
grass-roots thinking and feeling and more highly articulated and structured 
expressions of political thought’.2 
 Freeden also challenged the assumption that ideas were epiphenomena that 
reflected ‘real’ social and economic relations. This conception of ideology had 
been inherited from the ontology of an earlier kind of Marxist analysis, and its 
implications were significant. As well as encouraging historians to regard ideas 
as being causally insignificant, it had also led some scholars to draw a distinction 
between ‘practical’ and ‘ideological’ modes of thought. Historians were thus 
disposed to regard ideology as an optional feature of politics whose influence was 
variable. Yet these assumptions were problematic, for they failed to acknowledge 
that even the most non-doctrinaire statements were imbued with ideological 
assumptions and values.3 
Finally, Freeden raised concerns about the way that historians had 
classified political ideologies. Too often, Freeden claimed, it was assumed that 
Britain’s liberal, socialist and conservative traditions were distinctive formations 
whose boundaries were clearly defined, and as a consequence, historians had 
tended to attribute particular policy innovations to the direct influence of these 
discrete ideologies. Freeden demonstrated the deficiency of these conclusions by 
drawing attention to the permeable boundaries that existed between different 
ideologies. Because they share common concepts, different ideologies, he argued, 
necessarily overlap. And as they meet the demands of new historical contexts, 
they often colonise the conceptual terrain that had once been occupied by rival 
bodies of thought. Accordingly, Freeden advocated an approach to the study of 
ideologies that acknowledged their fluid conceptual boundaries and 
accommodated their logical contradictions. Evident here were insights that came 
to inform the conceptual model of studying ideologies that Freeden would later 
develop.4  
 Freeden concluded his analysis by drawing attention to the virtues of 
methodological pluralism. A range of analytical tools, he argued, would be 
necessary to illuminate the different features of political ideologies and the way 
they functioned within different social contexts.  
 
History and the ‘Ideational Turn’ 
 
In recent decades, scholars in a number of disciplines have devoted greater 
attention to political ideas. Indeed some writers have made reference to an 
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‘ideational turn’ that has transformed the way that political systems are 
understood.5 This shift can, in part, be attributed to the slow decline of older 
explanatory frameworks that defined ideas as an epiphenomena of political life. 
But of equal significance has been the influence of new developments in political 
philosophy and social science that have opened up new ways of understanding 
human consciousness.6 This ideational turn has been most visible in the field of 
political analysis, where new research programmes have emerged that are 
concerned, above all else, with determining the relationship between ideas and 
political change.7 But historians, including many who are concerned with the 
history of modern Britain, have also reconsidered the way that they engage with 
ideas. Three general developments can be identified. First, it has become common 
for historians of twentieth-century Britain to suggest that socio-economic 
phenomena are discursively mediated.8 Post-war economic decline, for instance, 
is now conceived as a phenomenon whose meanings were constructed as much 
by commentators and politicians as they were by concrete material forces.9 And 
the economic crises that have been associated with episodes of political change 
have come to be regarded as the subjects of narratives that had no necessary 
correspondence with external realities.10 Not all of the scholars who have 
contributed to this development have made direct engagements with the concept 
of ideology. Indeed many, particularly those under the influence of Foucauldian 
ideas, have been reluctant to employ this category.11 But because their studies 
often make reference to acts of discursive narration that are necessarily attempts 
to control the meanings of a particular event or phenomenon, their studies have 
nonetheless opened up analytical space that ideology can occupy.   
 Second, historians of modern Britain have begun to award greater causal 
significance to political ideas. Challenging those models of political behaviour 
that tended to regard material interests as being constitutive of political ideas, 
they have illuminated the way in which the latter have often mediated the former. 
Some historians of 1980s Britain, for instance, have disputed the argument that 
Thatcherism’s ascendency followed from social and economic changes whose 
consequences were fixed. Instead, they argue, the interests of electors, financial 
institutions and others actors were determined by discursive interventions that 
were ideological in nature.12 In part, this shift can be attributed to the social 
constructivist models of behaviour that have been developed by Peter Hall and 
Mark Blyth.13 These models, which have been sensitive to the importance of 
history to political processes, have broken decisively with the ontology of rational 
choice theory and have awarded ideas a central role in determining political 
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conduct. They have also reconceptualised the nature of ideological competition. 
Whereas older accounts tended to regard the activities of elites and policy-makers 
as being of central importance, these models award greater significance to the 
broader social arena in which these actors are located. Policy-makers and other 
state actors, it is argued, operate within a discursive environment that is shaped 
by wider social forces, such that the conduct of the former can only be adequately 
understood in the context of the latter.14  
 Third, historians have become more interested in the relationship between 
formal, structured patterns of high political thought and the social conditions from 
which they emerged. No longer are Britain’s traditions of liberalism, social 
democracy and conservatism understood as the products of elite thinking that 
have been imposed upon the British state by elites. Rather, they are more likely 
to be conceived as social formations that have been shaped by cultural change. 
Here, the influence of the ‘new political history’ has been particularly 
influential.15 Contributors to this tradition have sought to locate party politics 
within much broader social and cultural contexts, and in doing so, they have made 
two contributions to the way political ideologies are understood. First, they have 
demonstrated that political ideologies are often social constructs that operate 
within a discursive context that is shaped by vernacular forms of thinking. And 
second, they have exposed the vast range of institutions and groups that have 
shaped political contestation within the parliamentary arena.16 
 While some scholars have explored the complexity of the major ideologies 
of British politics, others have drawn attention to the formations that competed 
with them for authority. Feminism, ecologism and other ideologies have thus 
been recognised as important ideational systems that have done much to shape 
Britain’s political landscape.17 And it has also become more common for 
historians to regard non-state actors as important producers of political ideas. The 
chief consequence of these developments has been to disrupt the view that British 
politics was marked by a dispute between three major ideologies whose character 
was determined by a small number of political elites. 
Together, these three developments have done much to marginalise many 
of the assumptions that Michael Freeden described in his aforementioned 
intervention. Not only have they exposed the deficiency of older explanatory 
frameworks that denied ideas a significant causal role, but they have also 
displaced the negative definition of ideology that concealed many formations 
from the historian’s gaze. But if the more problematic assumptions that Freeden 
described have been challenged, it is possible to identify the emergence of others 
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that continue to obscure the central role that ideas have played in British political 
life. One of the most notable concerns the ontological status that is awarded to 
ideology. As we have seen, it is now less common for historians to define 
ideology as false consciousness. What can be detected, however, are instances 
where ideology is defined in relation to ‘scientific’ or ‘objective’ forms of 
knowledge.18 Consider, for instance, the tendency for histories of the Labour 
party to describe Harold Wilson as a non-ideological figure who was concerned, 
above all else, with practical questions.19 At one level, these formulations serve a 
necessary function. Indeed they draw a distinction between different kinds of 
political thinking that are informed by different epistemological beliefs. What 
they also threaten to do, however, is to define ideology as an eliminable feature 
of political life. For it follows that there are forms of social signification which 
are free of ideology and which are capable of representing an external reality in 
its true form. It would be more appropriate, then, to draw a distinction between 
rationalist and non-rationalist ideologies. Such a distinction acknowledges that 
different ideologies are informed by different epistemologies, but it does not 
invite the notion that some are less ideological than others.  
 The notion that ideology is necessarily doctrinaire also conceals the 
ideological character of ‘non-ideological’ statements. As Ewen Green noted in 
his study of Conservatism, such statements are ideological acts.20 Not only are 
they informed by certain epistemological assumptions, but they also emerge from 
a particular understanding of appropriate political action. And once this is 
acknowledged, even the most disinterested and non-doctrinaire statements come 
to acquire ideological meanings. It thus becomes necessary to recognise the vast 
range of institutions and individuals who have contributed to the production and 
reproduction of ideologies. Yet even recent studies of Britain’s political 
ideologies tend to privilege the thought and practices of those individuals who 
have been engaged in particular kinds of thinking. Indeed those individuals who 
produced elaborate and coherent statements of political thought are often 
conceived as the most influential producers of ideas. 
Because some scholars have reproduced the notion that ideologies are 
doctrinaire, they have also implied that ideology is a feature of political life whose 
presence is variable. Yet this formulation invites some problematic historical 
assumptions. Chief amongst them is the idea that some historical periods are more 
ideological than others. As Freeden noted, this conceals the way in which 
pragmatism and agreement are often the product of ideological assumptions and 
beliefs, and it also encourages the idea that some forms of political practice can 
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be understood without making reference to the thought that informs them.  Yet 
some narratives of modern Britain have nonetheless reproduced it. Consider, for 
instance, how some accounts describe Britain’s post-war politics. While the 
1950s and 1960s were decades marked by the relative absence of ideology, the 
1970s, they argue, was punctuated by fervent ideological debate.  It may be 
necessary, then, for historians to reconsider the relationship between ideas and 
political conflict. The presence of the latter does not preclude the absence of the 
former. And as Freeden once noted, it may be that periods of relative political 
calm are the product of an ideology’s ability to secure hegemony.21  
The tendency to regard ideology as a doctrinaire form of knowledge is, of 
course, a more general phenomenon. Raymond Williams once observed that since 
its inception, the ‘limiting condition’ of the concept of ideology was that it tended 
to restrict ‘processes of meaning and valuation to formed, separable “ideas” or 
“theories”’.22 But if it would be inappropriate to blame historians for the 
reproduction of a narrow definition of ideology, it is also the case that they are 
well-positioned to expose its deficiencies. Not only can they reveal the contingent 
and thus ideological nature of the most benign and enduring features of British 
political life, but they can also untangle the complex ideological contestation that 




In his intervention, Freeden was critical of the ‘simple tagging’ method that had 
often been employed to determine the character of Britain’s ideological traditions. 
Too often, he argued, scholars had operated on the assumption that these 
formations had ‘mutually exclusive contours’ and had, in turn, sought to identify 
the single concept or belief that defined them.23 Continuing his analysis, Freeden 
suggested that once attention was drawn towards the conceptual content of these 
formations, it became apparent that such notions were problematic. Ideologies 
were thus described as ‘complex structures that display a number of 
configurations, linked by family resemblances, but having components shared 
with other ideologies’.24  
 Freeden’s morphological conception of ideologies has been taken up by a 
number of studies, and it is now common for general accounts to acknowledge 
the blurred conceptual barriers that separated Britain’s progressive ideologies.25 
But the full implications of Freeden’s work have not yet been acknowledged, and 
it is still possible to locate some accounts that categorise ideologies in 
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problematic ways. Here, it is useful to make particular reference to the 
historiography of British Conservatism. Recent studies of this tradition have 
disputed the argument that Conservatism is a ‘non-ideological’ disposition, and 
as a result, we are now equipped with a number of detailed and illuminating 
descriptions of the ideas and beliefs that informed the thought and practices of 
the Conservative party.26 But some of these accounts, in their efforts to identify 
the organising principle of Conservatism, have produced some problematic 
propositions. Perhaps the most troubling is the suggestion that Conservatism is a 
philosophy of inequality. This argument, as I have argued elsewhere, fails to 
acknowledge the epistemology that informs conservative thinking.27 Because 
they are suspicious of rationalism, conservatives are unwilling to suggest that any 
particular concept or arrangement is of universal value. And as a result, their 
willingness to endorse any concepts or arrangements is necessarily contingent 
and mediated by experience. To suggest that a commitment to preserving 
inequality is their core belief is thus to ignore conservatism’s distinctive 
morphology. Inequality, like any other substantive concept within the 
conservative lexicon, is, in theory at least, eliminable.   
 The search for Conservatism’s conceptual core has not only obscured the 
peculiar character of Conservatism; it has also concealed its remarkable 
flexibility. Because there are no logical constraints on what social and political 
arrangements a Conservative can endorse, they are prone to modifying their 
beliefs in response to novel circumstances. Indeed, as one leading Conservative 
wrote in 1947, they see ‘nothing immoral or even eccentric in “catching the 
Whigs bathing and walking away with their clothes”’.28 It is unsurprising, then, 
that Conservatives have both defended and deplored the state and have celebrated 
and challenged the virtues of free enterprise. Yet some studies, in their efforts to 
identify consistent patterns within Conservatives discourses, have threatened to 
conceal the malleability of Conservatives’ programmatic commitments. Some 
accounts, for instance, regard Margaret Thatcher as an ideologue who, in her 
efforts to anchor the Conservative party to a monetarist economic strategy, 
departed from the conservative tradition.29 And others seize upon certain 
arrangements, such as private property relations, and describe them as universal 
features of any Conservative vision.30 
 A related point can be made regarding the way in which Britain’s major 
ideologies are situated in relation to one other. Taking up the insights of Freeden 
and other scholars, historians have developed a sensitivity to the way in which 
Britain’s liberal and social democratic formations have over-lapped.31 Jackson’s 
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impressive study of socialist through has, for instance, done much to reveal the 
enduring influence that liberal ideas exerted upon the thinking of post-war social 
democrats.32 It is more difficult, however, to locate discussion of the relationship 
between Conservatism and other ideologies.33 And this omission is significant, 
since it exposes a failure to adequately recognise the way in which rival 
ideologies have determined the conceptual content of Conservatism.  In a vital 
sense, Conservatism is a reflective ideology.34 It does not generate its own 
meanings; rather, it acquires them from the rival ideologies that threaten to 
dismantle the harmony of the organic social order. Indeed it could be claimed that 
the true task of conservatism is a profoundly negative one. Instead of seeking to 
construct a vision of the future that is informed by its rational enquiry, it aims to 
counter those concepts and argument that are expounded by whatever progressive 
ideology it encounters.35 The implications of this insight are numerous. Most 
importantly, it invites the notion that Conservatism cannot be fully understood 
unless its history is situated alongside those of Britain’s progressive traditions. It 
would be useful, then, for future studies to devote greater attention to the way in 
which Conservatives have understood, and responded to, the ideological 
innovations of their progressive opponents. Such work would not only expose the 
contingent nature of the conservatives’ conceptual lexicon; it would marginalise 
the assumption that there is an ‘authentic’ variant of conservatism that can be 
employed as a barometer to judge others.  
Finally, it must be noted that conservative concepts and ideas have not been 
the exclusive property of institutions and individuals that choose to refer to 
themselves as conservatives. Consider, for instance, the conservative tendency to 
regard societies as organic wholes that are comprised of interdependent 
components.36 This notion is such a ubiquitous feature of British Conservative 
discourse that it is tempting to regard it as a proprietary feature of its conceptual 
architecture. But an enquiry into rival ideologies reveals that it has often informed 
the thinking of Conservatives’ political opponents. One of the most important 
statements of post-war social democratic thought, Anthony Crosland’s The 
Future of Socialism, thus contained the following statement:  
 
The fact is that a society like ours is an organic unity … one so 
highly organised and interdependent between its various parts, 
resting as it does on a balance of tensions, thrusts, and stresses, that 
intervention at one point will have effects at numerous and often 
unexpected other points. One therefore cannot give it a shock of 
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more than a certain violence without the risk of damage to the entire 
structure.37 
 
It would be absurd, of course, to suggest that Crosland was a conservative. Many 
of his core beliefs, namely his belief in the virtues of social equality, were at odds 
with conservatives’ epistemological views. What this statement demonstrates, 
however, is that conservative concepts could traverse the boundaries between 
parliamentary parties.  
This insight has wider implications for our understanding of British 
politics. Most importantly, it invites us to reconsider the nature of policy change. 
As Freeden noted, it was once common for historians to assume that particular 
policies could be located neatly within Britain’s distinctive ideological traditions 
and that their fortunes were tied to the relative health of these formations. Once 
we acknowledge that the conceptual architecture of these traditions has often 
over-lapped, this assumption becomes problematic. Indeed it may be more 
appropriate to suggest that certain policy proposals and ideas gained salience 
because they were commensurable with common features of competing 
ideological formations. Recent studies on the influence of Keynes’ economic 
ideas have certainly invited conclusions of this kind.38 Many of Keynes’ ideas 
were incompatible beliefs that informed Labour and Conservative thought. Yet 
both parties were able to endorse some Keynesian propositions because they were 
commensurable with their common hostility to classical liberal ideas and their 
shared commitment to full employment. 
 
 
The Causal Role of Ideas 
 
Until recently, it was common for historians of modern Britain to regard ideology 
as an epiphenomena of political change. Even scholars who attempted to draw 
attention to the causal role of ideas often conceptualised them in ways that 
concealed their causal significance. In part, this tendency followed from the 
assumption that other features of political systems, such as interests, were 
external to ideological influence. Thus Anthony Seldon, in a discussion of the 
role that ideas played in determining post-war public policy, suggested that ‘ideas 
are not enough’. Only when ideas were able to correspond with the interests of 
important groups, he argued, could they exert a substantial influence upon 
political conduct. Indeed he concluded that ‘what is surprising about the impact 
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of ideas on post-war British history is just how limited rather than great their 
impact has been.’39 In recent decades, many studies have challenged these 
formulations. Not only have they exposed the way in which ideas mediate the 
interests of actors, but they have also drawn attention to the way in which events 
are understood through discursive frameworks.40 To some extent, these 
innovations have followed from the slow and uneven dissolution of older 
historiographical traditions that awarded causal primacy to extra-ideological 
phenomena. But of equal significance has been the proliferation of new 
interpretive frameworks that have compelled historians to reconsider the 
relationship between ideas and other features of political systems. Particular 
attention can be drawn to the Kuhnian models of learning that have been 
advanced by Peter Hall and others.41 According to these models, actors operate 
within paradigms of knowledge that condition their understanding of the social 
context that they operate within. But these paradigms can be disrupted when 
events contravene their logic, and in such instances, new ideas can reshape the 
political terrain and influence public policy.42  
By awarding ideas a crucial role in determining the outcomes of political 
crises, these models have done much to place ideology at the centre of political 
systems. And in recent years, some scholars of modern Britain have employed 
them to develop a better understanding of the conditions in which certain political 
ideas took root. It may be necessary, however, for historians to refine their 
analytical assumptions that inform these explanatory systems; for some of these 
assumptions, as recent studies have demonstrated, present some conceptual 
problems. Perhaps the most significant of these concerns the notion that ideas are 
only influential when exogenous forces disrupt prevailing patterns of thought. 
This proposition introduces an inconsistent ontology; for according to its logic, 
ideas can be both constitutive and auxiliary forces.43 In a sense, then, they 
preserve what Freeden termed the ‘on-off switch’ conception of ideology.44 On 
the one hand, they suggest that ideas are a priori determinants of political action. 
But on the other, they suggest that their influence is dependent on the presence of 
peculiar historical conditions.  
The argument that uncertainty is an exceptional feature of political systems 
can also be challenged. This proposition, as Hay and Gofas have noted, follows 
from the assumption that relative political stability allows actors to gain more 
complete information about their social context.45 Yet such an assumption 
threatens to reintroduce the notion that ideologies are eliminable features of 
politics that only exist to fill information deficits that arise when the extra-
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ideological forces no longer supply actors with a clear understanding of their 
interests. It is thus difficult to reconcile with an ontology that takes as its starting-
point the constitutive role of ideas.  
 Kuhnian models also conceptualise ideas in a parochial manner. Indeed 
they tend to define ideas as cognitive road maps that can serve functional 
objectives rather than bodies of beliefs and values that can shape actors’ moral 
positions. It is unsurprising, then, they have been employed to explain the 
influence of particular economic doctrines, such as Keynesianism and 
monetarism, at the expense of other ideologies that rendered them acceptable. Yet 
it is difficult to understand the ascendency of these doctrines unless that are 
understood as political, as well as economic, bodies of ideas. When Labour party 
figures engaged with Keynes’ ideas in the 1940s and 1950s, they were not just 
concerned with the question of whether or not they were capable of achieving 
economic growth. They were also asking questions about the appropriate form of 
the state, the desirability of private consumption and the adequate distribution of 
wealth.46  
Historians are well-placed to expose the limitations of the explanatory 
models that are being produced within social science.47 Armed with concrete 
empirical evidence of actors’ thought and behaviour, they can test the 
assumptions that inform them. And with their knowledge of different historical 
contexts, they can also reveal the specificity of the ideas that political scientists 
are often preoccupied with. As yet, however, few historians have engaged with 
the literatures that have emerged from social science’s ‘historical turn’. In part, 
their reluctance to do so may stem from basic epistemological differences. But as 
political analysis takes its own historical turn, it may be that these differences 
become less pronounced in future decades.48  
 
Locating Ideology  
 
As well as drawing attention to the range of ideologies that have shaped the 
political terrain, historians of twentieth century Britain have also exposed the 
variety of institutions and groups that have contributed to the production of 
political ideas. Indeed think-tanks, pressure groups and debating societies have 
all been identified as institutions that have played an important role in producing 
and circulating ideas.49 In part, this development has followed from a 
reconsideration of the way in which ideas intervene in policy change. As Freeden 
noted, older accounts tended to award primacy to the influence of a small number 
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of intellectuals who constructed formal and elaborate statements of political 
thought. Recent studies, by contrast, have suggested that the influence of 
particular ideas was often mediated by the institutions and individuals that 
articulated them to policy-makers and opinion-formers. Indeed their authors have 
demonstrated that these agents not only popularised the ideas of political elites; 
they also modified their meanings in order to maximise their appeal.50 But if we 
are now equipped with an awareness of the range of institutions that have been 
engaged in the production and consumption of political ideas, it is nonetheless 
the case that political parties tend to be regarded as the supreme arbiters of their 
value. Indeed most studies of Britain’s liberal, socialist and conservative tradition 
tend to be anchored to the histories of Britain’s main parties. And those ideologies 
that have been explored with greatest enthusiasm have often been those that 
political parties have taken up. Consider, for instance, the ideology of neo-
liberalism. Often, the rise of this ideology is tied to the history of the British 
Conservative party and, in particular, the actions of Keith Joseph and Margaret 
Thatcher. Yet this preoccupation with the Conservative party, as Ben Jackson has 
recently demonstrated, obscures the way in which neo-liberal ideas took up 
themes and ideas that could be found in progressive ideologies.51  It must also be 
noted that political parties have often been unreliable vehicles for the ideologies 
that they claim to represent.52 In order to serve their electoral interests, they often 
advocate policies that contravene the logic of the ideological traditions that they 
are situated within. And because they are often pre-occupied with the immediate 
political and social contexts they inhabit, the relationship between their 
programmatic commitments and their core beliefs is often obscured. It is 
unsurprising, then, that the most elaborate and coherent statements of ideology 
are often produced by individuals and groups who are on the margins of their 
respective parties.53 Political parties should thus be located within much broader 
communities of thought.  
 Historians could also do more to reveal the full range of concerns, values 
and beliefs that have been contained within political ideologies. Ideologies are 
not only clusters of concepts that are employed to describe a desirable social and 
political order. They are also comprised of epistemological beliefs, conceptions 
of temporality and understandings of space.54 As yet, however, historians of 
twentieth century Britain have not uncovered these kinds of beliefs. And such 
omissions are significant, for it is often these beliefs which determined the way 
in which political ideologies organised their conceptual architecture. In the case 
of Conservatism, for instance, the conceptual content of the ideology has always 
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been mediated by its particular epistemology. Its adherents, by virtue of their 
limited conception of rationality, can only endorse a particular concept on a 
contingent basis. Indeed they must acknowledge that there are no concepts or 
arrangements that are universally desirable. If we are to better understand the 
nature of post-war Conservatism, then, it would be appropriate to examine not 
only the way in which Conservatives have modified their understandings of the 
state, the market and the social order, but to also study the epistemological views 
that informed such adjustments.  
 Drawing attention to these features of Britain’s political ideologies may 
also reveal ideological patterns that are concealed by the surface forms of political 
discourses. Post-war social democrats like Anthony Crosland and Bryan Magee 
regarded the attainment of social equality as the central objective of socialist 
politics. Yet because they were suspicious of the idea of universal truth, they were 
reluctant to privilege a specific definition of equality that could inform a vision 
of the future. As Magee put it, ‘the truth is [that] … in human affairs we can see 
only a short way ahead, and even then our predictions are highly fallible and often 
wrong.’55 What this example demonstrates is that the conceptual content of 
Britain’s political ideologies can be apprehended differently once their 
epistemological foundations are uncovered. 
 
New Directions  
 
This is not the appropriate place to construct an alternative narrative of twentieth 
century British politics that places ideology at its core. It is instructive, however, 
to identify some ways in which our general understanding of the period might be 
modified if historians engaged with some of the propositions that have been 
outlined above. That is not to say, of course, that these propositions, which are 
informed by the author’s own ontological assumptions and methodological 
preferences, should be universally endorsed. But by exposing their broader 
implications, we can evaluate what is at stake when we reconfigure our 
understanding of ideology.  
In the first instance, we can establish the implications of regarding ideology 
as a ubiquitous feature of political life. Within some general narratives, this 
notion is resisted, for their authors tend to suggest that some periods of Britain’s 
past were more ideological than others. Consider, for instance, the tendency to 
regard the 1950s as a decade when public policy was determined by pragmatic 
incrementalism rather than ideology. When a non-pejorative conception of 
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ideology is adopted, these kinds of distinctions become untenable. Indeed it 
becomes necessary to acknowledge that periods of relative political stability may 
reflect the hegemony, rather than absence, of ideological thought practices.56 It 
may become necessary, then, to construct new readings of post-1945 British 
politics. The alleged post-war settlement, rather than being understood as a stable 
system of pragmatic, consensual governance, could be reconceptualised as an 
ideological edifice that was forged on the basis of common assumptions about 
appropriate political conduct.57   
Second, we can consider the implications of the morphological conception 
of ideologies that has been advocated by Freeden and others. This approach, as 
has been noted above, has informed a number of recent studies, but as yet, its full 
implications have not yet been acknowledged According to its logic, ideologies 
are thought practices that seek to attempt to fix the meanings of essentially 
contested concepts. Once we acknowledge this essential contestability, we are 
compelled to accept that no movement or group has exclusive control over the 
raw materials of political thinking. And in turn, it becomes necessary to adopt a 
more diachronic approach to the study of ideologies that is sensitive to the way 
in which different concepts have acquired and shed meanings over time. 58   
Engaging more fruitfully with a morphological approach to the study of 
ideologies would also reveal those concepts and ideas that have traversed the 
political divide but which have been anchored to different ideological formations. 
A provisional list might include those of meritocracy, efficiency, progress and 
public interest. All of these concepts have, of course, been integrated into 
accounts of twentieth century British politics. But there is a tendency to regard 
them as stable carriers of meaning that are employed by actors when historical 
conditions render those meanings politically useful. A morphological approach 
would instead place emphasis on the way in which actors have imbued concepts 
with different meanings in response to social, cultural and political change.   
Being sensitive to a morphological conception of ideologies may also 
compel scholars to collapse some of the older categories that often inform general 
accounts of Britain’s intellectual politics. Chief amongst them are those of ‘left’ 
and ‘right’, which, despite their resilience, often obscure the complexity of 
Britain’s political ideologies. Not only do these categories encourage the student 
of ideology to privilege particular concepts at the expense of others, but they also 
invite the notion that centrist ideologies are synthetic entities that possess no 
distinctive conceptual resources.59 Once we acknowledge these problems, we 
may be compelled to reconsider many parties and individuals that have 
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contributed to Britain’s political development. Centrist parties, such as the short-
lived Social Democratic Party, would be reconceptualised as institutions that 
possessed distinctive political ideas.60 ‘Pragmatic’ politicians would become 
recognised as the producers of important ideas about appropriate political 
conduct. And administrative institutions would no longer be understood as the 
opponents of ideology.  
Finally, historians that are more sensitive to the complexity of political 
ideologies may develop a more pluralistic conception of ideological competition 
that took place in twentieth century Britain. Despite recent work that has sought 
to challenge epochal narratives, it remains common for particular decades to be 
associated with the dominance of clearly-defined ideologies. Future accounts, by 
contrast, may place emphasis on the ways in which ideologies absorb and shed 
concepts and ideas from their rivals in order to legitimate their core beliefs. In 
doing so, they may illuminate the hybridity of the political ideologies that have 




Since Michael Freeden made his intervention in the first issue of Twentieth 
Century British History, historians of modern Britain have done much to integrate 
political ideologies into their accounts. And in doing so, they have marginalised 
the pejorative definition of the concept that was once predominant. Many of the 
analytical frameworks that have informed this turn to ideology have, however, 
contained propositions that obscure the full implications of taking ideology 
seriously. As well as retaining some of the reductivist meanings that were 
embedded within older definitions of ideology, they have also concealed the 
ubiquitous nature of ideological activity. If it is no longer appropriate, then, to 
regard ideology as the stranger at the feast, it remains true that historians have 
much to learn from innovations in the field of ideology studies.  
What might be done to further advance historians’ interest in, and 
understanding of, political ideologies? Three suggestions present themselves. 
First, it may be beneficial for historians of modern Britain to engage more directly 
with the field of conceptual history.61 At its best, this research programme 
exposes the contingent and indeed ideological nature of the basic categories that 
structure political language. By drawing upon its insights, historians of modern 
Britain could thus illuminate those concepts that have traversed different 
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ideologies and refine our understanding of the way in which political ideologies 
sought to contain their meanings.  
Second, historians might need to engage in comparative approaches that 
bring Britain’s ideological traditions into dialogue with those of other national 
contexts. Although we are now equipped with rich and sophisticated accounts of 
Britain’s ‘major’ ideologies, little attempt has been made to place them in a 
relationship with comparable formations elsewhere.62 Doing so would, however, 
yield some instructive insights. Not only would it help to identify the peculiarity 
of the conceptual assemblages that British ideologies have constructed, but it 
would also illuminate the historical conditions that have allowed particular ideas 
to obtain influence in different geographical contexts.   
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it would be profitable for historians 
to acknowledge the distinctive contribution that they can make to the field of 
ideology studies. As the above discussion has demonstrated, political ideologies 
cannot be understood unless they are historicised. As yet, it has often been 
political theorists and social scientists that have taken up this task. But their 
analytical frameworks, which tend to tend to privilege synchronic rather than 
diachronic analysis, threaten to extract ideologies from their particular historical 
contexts. Equipped with empirical evidence and the ability to evaluate change 
over time, historians can expose the peculiarity of these contexts and, in turn, hold 
abstract models of ideational change to account.  
Although the above discussion has been informed by the author’s 
methodological preferences and ontological assumptions, it should not be read as 
a call for the primacy of a particular methodological framework. Methodological 
pluralism, as several writers have noted, is both necessary and desirable. And as 
Leader Maynard has observed, the interaction of different research programmes 
can be mutually beneficial.63 This methodological pluralism cannot be successful, 
however, unless different disciplines acknowledge the peculiar contributions that 
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